Just Mars / His.

PApproved For Release 2002/05/08 FOR 79R00890A000200040017-3

To there, a regard source unburren to mondas briefing nostereal

NSC BRIEFING

11 February 1954

## VIETNAMESE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

- I. Nationalism is powerful force in Vietnam
  - A. No lack of emotional and rational basis for strong anti-Communist political effort.
  - B. But Viets still not willing to go all-out against Viet Minh.
  - C. Little chance of changing their minds until they get what they want:
    - 1. Elimination of French power.
    - 2. Vietnam government at least ostensibly responsive to popular will and welfare.
- II. French power in Vietnam is reality, not Vietnamese delusion.
  - A. Viets are not impressed by high-sounding preambles of French-Viet treaties.
  - B. They appreciate need for French military support, but they also know that French controls, military and other, go far beyond what French require for efficient prosecution of war.
  - C. This causes Viet suspicion that they are being asked to fight for France, not Vietnam.
  - D. Effective will-to-fight can't be inspired without reversing this situation.

CLASS CHARGED TO: TS S C NEXT DEVICE PAYS:

MUST be holwing Approved For Re

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200400017w3

- III. Vietnam government is suspect, too, because too squarely under thumb of Bao Dai.
  - A. Strong nationalist objections to Bao Dai as man and institution.
    - As man, he lacks clear and unswerving dedication to nationalism.
    - As institution -- the Chief of State -his powers are too absolute.
      - a. To serve in Vietnam government now is to be wholly at whim of Bao Dai.
  - IV. Strongest anti-Communist political elements are the Dai Viet party, the Roman Catholic community and the politico-religious Cao Dai sect.
    - A. Dai Viet has able, intelligent leaders, with excellent nationalist records; it controls governorship of Tonkin and has defense and information posts in present cabinet.
    - B. Roman Catholics number over 1 million; they are led by intensely nationalistic bishops who exert far-reaching moral and temporal authority through hundreds of parishes.
    - C. Cao Dai is bizarre mixture of Buddhism and
      Christianity, whose saints include George
      Washington, Christ, and Victor Hugo. It has

a pope with strong warlord tendencies backed up by 20,000 troops. But it would be strong asset if properly "nationalized."

- V. Development of broadly popular leaders and parties is very slow.
  - A. Main reason is fear that political activity under French aegis will boomerang in the future.
  - B. Another is curbs on political activity by the Vietnamese government.
  - C. Conservatism of government has discouraged development of large political potential of labor unions, peasant organizations, and other natural interest groups; Viet Minh did not make this mistake.

## Approved For Release 2002/05/07: CIA-RDP79R00890A000200040017-3 NSC BRIEFING 11 February 1954

## VIETNAMESE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

- I. Nationalism powerful force.
  - A. Emotional basis strong anti-Commie effort exists.
  - B. But Viets hang back, pending:
    - 1. Elimination French power.
    - 2. Responsible Vietnam government.
- II. French power reality, not Viet delusion.
  - A. High-sounding treaties mean little.
  - B. French military support needed, but power excessive.
  - C. Viets fear they fight for France.
  - D. No will-to-fight in these conditions.
- III. Viets suspect Bao Dai's absolutist leanings.
  - A. His nationalist record not clear.
  - B. He has too much power.

Approved For Release 2002/05/01 CIA-RDP79R00890A000200040017-3

## Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000200040017-3

- IV. Strongest anti-Communist elements are Dai Viet party, Catholics, Cao Dai sect.
  - A: Dai Viets are bona fide nationalists
    hold key posts in present
    government.
  - B. One million Catholics under intensely nationalistic native bishops.
  - C. Cao Dai is mixture Buddhism and Christianity; warlord tendencies backed up by 20,000 troops.
- v. Political activity retarded.
  - A. Viets fear to compromise themselves in regime still under French influence.
  - B. Political activity is curbed by Vietnamese government.
  - C. No mass organizations (peasants, labor) due conservatism of

Approved For Regenser2002/05/07; CIA-RDP79R00890A000200040017-3